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**FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION APPROPRIATE
TO AN EXTERNAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATION**

The following list of topics has been selected with a number of criteria in mind which should govern the determination of what kinds of research conducted by an external organization could be particularly useful to the policy planning agencies of the United States Government.

In the first place, problems tackled by such an organization should be long-run, fundamental problems which are unlikely to be systematically examined internally within the government because of the pressure of current decision making.

In the second place, they should be problems which cut across the interests and responsibilities of two or more departments of the government and for which therefore no one department is likely to take full or exclusive responsibility. In particular there is no adequate place in the government at the moment for the systematic examination of longer-run policy problems involving the interaction of military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of U. S. foreign policy.

Thirdly, they should be problems involving both intelligence and policy aspects. One of the most limiting barriers implicit in the present organization of government to effective policy analysis is the separation of intelligence activities and planning and policy activities.

Fourth, the problems to be tackled by an external research organization of the kind here envisaged should be ones requiring a high level of imagination and analytic competence rather than the routine examination of a large bulk of material. The effectiveness of an organization of this sort will be, beyond a certain point, inversely proportional to its size. If it develops the kind of large staff required for the processing of a large volume of research material of relatively low average yield, the flexibility and usefulness of the organization will be greatly reduced.

The complex of problems facing U.S. foreign policy is a continuum in which everything is related to everything else. Any division of this continuum into separate project pieces is bound to be somewhat arbitrary. What follows is intended to be suggestive of some of the issues rather than to be a prospectus for a series of actual projects.

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1. The Theory and Techniques of Cold War Policy Formulation. This would involve an imaginative look at the ways in which alternative courses of action now get formulated in the U. S. Government, the ways in which their possible consequences are evaluated, and the methods employed for selecting the optimal pattern of choices in a given situation. The main emphasis would be on developing new techniques rather than on an institutional description of present procedures. There are a number of apparent weaknesses in present policy formulation practices which such an imaginative exploration of alternatives would attempt to eliminate. As mentioned above, intelligence is for organizational reasons not adequately integrated with consideration of U. S. objectives and available instrumentalities. Procedures are inadequate for examining the consequences over an extended period into the future of the adoption of any particular policy position at a moment of time. In other words, devices need to be developed for projecting consequences of any given decision forward through a number of successive stages of interaction of U. S. decisions with those of other allied and potentially hostile states. Third, the structure of the government imposes serious limitations on the coordinated planning of the use of policy instruments administered by various departments. This project would examine various devices both theoretical and administrative for overcoming these and other weaknesses. It would look at the possible application of present military planning procedures to cold war planning. It would consider the possibility of developing political war gaming. It would examine the possible role of the theory of games and other mathematical formulations of interacting policy. This project would be a continuing one which should work with the materials and situations presented by other substantive projects. It is suggested that this function¹ examination of planning procedures would be most useful and productive if applied concretely to a series of specific policy problems such as some of those outlined below.

2. The Implications of Present and Projected Changes in Military Technology for International Politics. The purpose of this project would be to examine the relative power position of states and ~~in~~ the implied uses of force or the threat of force as an instrument of policy resulting from present and foreseeable developments in military technology. A number of subtopics stand out here, each of which might well be a separate project in itself. For instance:

a. The political implications of atomic stalemate. Suppose, as some experts in military technology now predict, the situation arises in which the consequences for the initiating power of launching large-scale atomic attack are likely to be so serious that none of the major

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powers will or can use the threat of such attack as a serious policy instrument. What consequences are likely to follow?

b. A shift from a bi-polar to a multi-polar power system. It seems at least possible that one consequence of developing nuclear technology will be that it is quite within the means of relatively small powers to produce weapons of decisive destructiveness. The monopoly of the decisive instruments of world power by the United States and Russia may well disappear over the next decade. What are the implications of such a change for U. S. policy?

c. The consequences of shifts in the relative capabilities of offensive and defensive technologies. There is in some quarters a belief that the next few years will see a major improvement in the technological possibilities of defensive as against offensive operations. If a system of defense against atomic attack can be made sufficiently impressive to deter virtually anyone from attempting such attack, how will this affect the limits and opportunities of U. S. action? This is related, of course, to the two preceding issues. For instance, whereas offensive weapons are developing in such a way as to increase the potential of small states relative to large ones the reverse is probably true of defensive capabilities.

d. Arms control and disarmament. The technical possibilities, political framework, administrative techniques, and consequences for international relations of a variety of types of control and limitation of armaments are clearly among the most crucial issues facing us. These issues must be examined by a team of people including some eminently qualified in military technology, some who have devoted themselves to the modes of action and operational codes of leadership elements in the principal countries, experts in international organization, economists capable of estimating the costs of various techniques, and the like. An essential ingredient usually missing in short-term studies of this problem is thorough consideration of probable technological, political, and economic trends over a substantial time span into the future. There appears to be a high rate of obsolescence of what looked like acceptable disarmament schemes under the impact both of innovations in military technology and of changes in the political scene. A principal function of a study of this kind

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would be to trace as far as possible into the future the mode of operation and interaction of a variety of arms control schemes under alternative assumptions as to trends in the balance of power, in the internal structure of principal states, and in military technology.

3. Processes of Change under Totalitarianism. A systematic examination, historical and forward looking, of the ways in which totalitarian societies have in the past or might in the future evolve with the corresponding increases or decreases in the problems they pose for countries like the United States might be productive of new insights into ways in which the current situation could be over time rendered less threatening without culminating in war. The experience in such countries as Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R., itself, to date should yield suggestive hypotheses as to possible paths of change in the future. At a minimum such a study might at least increase the awareness of planning and operating officials of the width of the range of possible alternative developments over the future.

4. Approaches to Colonialism. A major issue which has faced us in the past and will certainly continue to face us over the coming decades is the issue of what the American attitude and policy should be toward areas in colonial or semi-colonial status. We have made some fairly obvious blunders in the past which should be re-examined and we face a set of problems in the future, predominantly in Africa, where the cumulative effect of a large number of individual decisions of a decade or more may be of great importance even though each individual decision appears not to be especially crucial. What are the kinds of colonial policies which are likely to minimize the chance that threatening instabilities will arise around the world, how can the United States promote such policies and at the same time retain the cooperation and good will of our European allies, what are likely to be the consequences of a failure to deal successfully with this problem are some of the issues to be tackled.

5. The Role, Attitudes, (and Potential Influence of the United States on) the Asian Intellectual. A large part of the world's population and a substantial proportion of its area is now and will in the future be controlled by a relatively small number of educated Asians. American policy influences in a great many ways the orientations and policies of this group of people. A systematic examination of the common elements in their preconceptions, their goals, and values, and the images they hold of the West might yield useful suggestions for U. S. policy with respect to organizations and media of communication and even with respect to political policy. This kind of a fundamental approach could, of course, be applied to Africa, Latin America, and other major regions of the world.

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6. The Future Potentialities, Role, and Orientation of Germany and Japan. These two ex-enemy countries which were once wielders of a degree of military power sufficient to threaten the world are currently in a position of economic, political, and military power and influence a good deal smaller than their natural and cultural resources would appear to support. It is a reasonable guess that both for this reason and because of their critically strategic position on the two edges of the Soviet bloc a great deal will depend on their future development. Fairly thorough examination of possible alternative paths of growth under these two areas and ways in which the U. S. can influence these would perhaps be useful.

7. The Use of Military Instruments for Political Purposes. This might have been a subheading under 2 above. It is notable that the organization of the U. S. Government has prevented as detailed and systematic an examination of the political implications of the use or threat of use of military power as should be undertaken. This applies both to the application of military power in limited areas and to a limited extent the application of such power in global conflict. "Project Control" has made an important start on this range of problems but much more needs to be done.

8. Alternative Ways in Which War Might Come about. Present thinking and planning for possible future conflicts tends to categorize the causes of such conflict into two broad groups: either somebody cold-bloodedly and calculatedly initiates global conflict with an all-out attack or by a process never very fully spelled out, "We stumbled by a series of miscalculations into war." Most intelligence appraisals concentrate their efforts on the probability of the first of these two situations with a brief bow to the possibility that there may be what is often called accidental war. There is room for a much more analytic attack on the problem of the sorts of circumstances and the kinds of developments which may lead to global conflict without at any point a single discreet decision by a major power to initiate it.

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